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A Recent Patent Class on 
the Scope of IPR Estoppel at the 
PTAB 
JOSHUA C. HARRISON, PH.D., ESQ.* 
INTRODUCTION 
Inter-partes review (IPR) has become a popular alternative 
for defendants to challenge the validity of patents asserted in 
district court infringement proceedings.1 However, a primary 
strategic concern facing such defendants in their decision 
whether to initiate an IPR, is the risk that the IPR 
proceedings may lead to estoppel (“IPR estoppel”) that later 
prevents strong invalidity arguments from being made in 
district court.2 The statutory basis for IPR estoppel is 
35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1), which states:3 
The petitioner in an inter partes review of a 
claim in a patent under this chapter that 
results in a final written decision under 
section 318(a), or the real party in interest or 
* Dr. Joshua Harrison is a partner at Barcelo, Harrison & Walker, LLP.
Dr. Harrison represents clients in intellectual property legal matters,
with a focus on patent preparation, prosecution, licensing, pre-litigation,
opinions, and litigation. Previously, Dr. Harrison was the research and
development manager at Seagate Technology, Associate Professor of
Engineering at the University of Queensland, an engineer at Applied
Magnetics Corp. and IBM Corp., and served in the U.S. Marine Corps
Reserve and U.S. Army Reserve for twenty-three years.
1 See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT AND APPEAL BOARD
STATISTICS, (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/AIA%20Statistics_March2017.pdf.
2 See infra notes 10–16 and accompanying text.
3 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) (2012).
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privy of the petitioner, may not request or 
maintain a proceeding before the Office with 
respect to that claim on any ground that the 
petitioner raised or reasonably could have 
raised during that inter partes review. 
This statute expressly limits estoppel to IPRs that result in 
a “final written decision,” and only to grounds the petitioner 
raised or “reasonably could have raised during” that IPR.4 
Hence, IPR estoppel does not apply to parties that are not the 
petitioner or in privity with the petitioner.5 IPR estoppel also 
does not apply to grounds of invalidity that could not be 
challenged in the IPR, such as indefiniteness or invalidity 
over prior art that is not a printed publication (e.g., prior art 
products).6 Still, the legislative history of the America 
Invents Act (AIA) suggests that the statute provides “a 
strengthened estoppel standard to prevent petitioners from 
raising in a subsequent challenge the same patent issues that 
were raised or reasonably could have been raised in a prior 
challenge.”7  
The foregoing statutory provision is implemented by 
consistent federal regulation,8 and by consistent 
jurisprudence at the Patent Trials and Appeal Board 
(“PTAB,” or “the Board”) of the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (“USPTO”).9 For example, the Board held that “[o]nce 
a Petitioner has obtained a final written decision, that 
Petitioner may not request or maintain subsequent 
proceedings on a ground that it ‘reasonably could have raised’ 
                                                          
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6  Id.; see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., 221 F. Supp. 
3d 534, 545 (D. Del. 2016). 
7 157 CONG. REC. S952 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. 
Grassley). 
8 See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d) (2016). 
9 See cases cited infra notes 14, 16, 19, and 24. 
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during the prior proceeding.”10 Presently there is a split 
among the district courts regarding whether IPR estoppel 
extends to grounds that were never raised by the petitioner 
in an IPR; most district courts find estoppel in that 
situation,11 while some district courts do not.12 A prudent 
petitioner will assume that estoppel may apply to all printed 
publications the petitioner “could have raised” in the petition, 
and this paper focuses on the practical scope of that estoppel. 
 
I. SCOPE: WHICH PRIOR PATENT PUBLICATIONS 
REASONABLY COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED? 
 
A zealous patent owner might argue that the petitioner 
“reasonably could have raised” any prior patent publication 
in its original petition for IPR, so that the petitioner should 
be estopped from maintaining or raising a challenge to 
validity on a ground that is based on any prior patent 
publication that was not raised in the original petition. 
But when IPR estoppel applies, could its scope 
properly include all patent publications? If not, which patent 
publications are swept into the scope of IPR estoppel, and 
which are not? Some recent PTAB jurisprudence helps 
answer those questions.13 
                                                          
10 Praxair Distribution, Inc. v. Ino Therapeutics LLC, No. IPR2016-
00781, Paper 10 at 7–10 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 25, 2016) (citing Dell, Inc. v. Elecs. 
& Telecomms. Research Inst., No. IPR2015-00549, Paper 10 at 4–6 
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 26, 2015)). 
11 See, e.g., Oil-Dri Corp. of Am. v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co., No. 15-cv-
1067, 2017 WL 3278915 at *1, *3, *4, *6, *7, *10 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2017); 
Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 990, 999 
(E.D. Wis. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 18-1516 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2018). 
12 See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., 221 F. Supp. 3d 534, 
553-54 (D. Del. 2016), denying reconsideration, 2017 WL 107980, at *1 
(D. Del. Jan. 11, 2017); see also Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa 
Diagnostics, Inc., 2017 WL 235048, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2017). 
13 See cases cited infra notes 19, 20, and 22. 
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The PTAB has adopted a test for IPR estoppel of a 
printed publication that derives from statements made in the 
legislative history of the AIA: whether a skilled searcher 
conducting a diligent search reasonably could have been 
expected to discover the prior art reference in question.14 For 
example, the PTAB recently noted that “[t]he legislative 
history of the America Invents Act [‘AIA’] broadly describes 
what ‘could have been raised’ to include ‘prior art which a 
skilled searcher conducting a diligent search reasonably 
could have been expected to discover.’”15 The PTAB justified 
and followed that test again in Johns Manville Corp. v. Knauf 
Insulation Inc., IPR2016-00130, as follows:  
The plain language of section 315(e)(1) states 
that the estoppel applies to grounds a 
petitioner “reasonably could have raised.” [. . 
.] The word “reasonably” is not a mandatory 
word such as, “must,” or “shall.” The word 
“reasonably” is a qualifier that refers to the 
discretion applied by a qualified searcher in 
conducting an adequate search. This is 
consistent with the legislative history of 
section 315 [. . .] the prior art estopped is that 
which “a skilled searcher conducting a 
diligent search reasonably could have been 
expected to discover.” Congress easily could 
have broadened the estoppel provision to 
extend to “any ground that the petitioner 
raised or [] could have raised during that 
inter partes review,” but it did not. 16 
 
                                                          
14 See IBM Corp. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, No. IPR2014-01465, 
Paper 32 at 5 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 6, 2015) (quoting 157 Cong. Rec. S1375 (daily 
ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl)). 
15 Id. 
16 Johns Manville Corp. v. Knauf Insulation, Inc., No. IPR2016-00130, 
Paper 35 at 9–10 (P.T.A.B. May 8, 2017). 
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II. IT DEPENDS: WHICH PRIOR PATENT PUBLICATIONS 
COULD A SKILLED SEARCHER CONDUCTING A 
DILIGENT SEARCH HAVE BEEN REASONABLY 
EXPECTED TO DISCOVER? 
 
Would the foregoing test be satisfied by every patent 
publication? After all, patents and published patent 
applications are readily accessible at government agencies 
like the USPTO.17 Patent publications are also stored in 
other electronic databases that are text-searchable using 
several alternative applications – many of which are search 
applications that are publicly available on the Internet.18  
On the other hand, the PTAB has held that “even for 
printed publications, a petitioner is free to explain why a 
reasonably diligent search could not have uncovered the 
newly applied prior art.”19 Whether a petitioner’s explanation 
is persuasive has been case specific. For example, the Board 
in Johns Manville held that “the skilled searchers employed 
by Johns Manville conducted a reasonably diligent search.”20 
Even though that reasonably diligent search failed to 
discover the documents in question, still estoppel was not 
found, and so a related motion to terminate was denied in the 
Final Written Decision of that case.21 On the other hand, the 
Board found estoppel in IBM Corp. v. Intellectual Ventures II 
LLC, IPR2014-01465, but in that case the Petitioner did not 
                                                          
17 See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/ 
patents-application-process/search-patents (Apr. 24, 2018). 
18 See, e.g., Free Patents Online, http://www.freepatentsonline.com/ 
search.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2018); Espacenet Patent Search, 
https://www.epo.org/searching-for-patents/technical/espacenet.html 
(Aug. 5, 2018); Google Patents, https://patents.google.com (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2018). 
19 Gen. Plastic Indus. Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, Nos. IPR2016-
01357-61, Paper 19 at 20 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 6, 2017). 
20 Manville Corp., No. IPR2016-00130, Paper 35 at 12. 
21 Id. at 12–15. 
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dispute the Patent Owner’s contention that a skilled searcher 
conducting a diligent search reasonably could have been 
expected to discover the later-asserted prior art.22 Instead, 
the Petitioner in IBM argued that the later-asserted prior art 
could not have been reasonably raised “because Petitioner 
could not have anticipated that Patent Owner would make 
certain arguments in the Preliminary Response filed in the 
earlier proceeding.”23 
 
III. APPROACH: WHICH USPC CLASSES AND 
SUBCLASSES REASONABLY WOULD BE INCLUDED IN 
A DILIGENT SEARCH CONDUCTED BY A SKILLED 
SEARCHER? 
 
Recently, the PTAB decided whether a prior U.S. patent 
publication was within the scope of IPR estoppel on the basis 
of whether its USPC class and subclass was among the USPC 
classes and subclasses that a reasonably diligent searcher 
would be expected to search.24 For prior U.S. patent 
publication references, this approach may help guide the 
analysis of whether a skilled searcher conducting a diligent 
search reasonably could have been expected to discover the 
reference. 
Specifically, in Valve Corp. v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd., 
the petitioner asserted U.S. Patent 6,362,813 to Wörn et al. 
(“Wörn”) in anticipation challenges against patent claims 
that it had previously challenged in earlier IPRs.25 
Subsequently, the Board promulgated final written decisions 
                                                          
22 See IBM Corp. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, No. IPR2014-01465, 
Paper 32 at 4 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 6, 2015). 
23 Id. at 3–4. 
24 See Valve Corp. v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd., IPR2017-00136 and 
IPR2017-00137, Paper 43 at 4–5 (P.T.A.B., Jan. 25, 2018). 
25 See Petition for Inter Partes Review of U.S. Patent No. 9,089,770, Valve 
Corp. v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd., Paper 1 at 3-4 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2016). 
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in the earlier IPRs, and so the patent owner moved to 
terminate the later-filed IPR proceedings on the basis of 
estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1).26  The patent owner 
argued that Wörn reasonably could have been raised in the 
earlier filed petitions.27 The petitioner responded by arguing 
that prior to filing the earlier petitions, it had contracted a 
skilled searcher who conducted a diligent search that did not 
discover Wörn, and therefore estoppel should not apply under 
the PTAB’s test.28   
The petitioner argued to replace the hypothetical 
speculation in the PTAB’s foregoing test with actual 
observation of historical search results, as follows:  
 
[I]f the Board finds that either the searches 
commissioned by Petitioner, or the Patent 
Examiner’s searches, had been skilled and 
reasonably diligent, then the Board need not 
speculate about whether such searches 
would have found Wörn. After all, those 
skilled and reasonably diligent searches, 
focused on the ’525 and ’770 patents, 
historically did not discover Wörn.  Rather, 
Wörn was discovered incidentally by a later 
search focused on a different patent, using a 
search term that does not apply to the ’525 
and ’770 patents. 29 
                                                          
26 See Patent Owner Motion to Terminate, Valve Corp. v. Ironburg 
Inventions Ltd., Nos. IPR2017-00136 and IPR2017-00137, at 1 (P.T.A.B. 
Oct. 13, 2017). 
27 Id. at 3–6. 
28 See Petitioner Opposition to the Motion to Terminate, Valve Corp. v. 
Ironburg Inventions Ltd., No. IPR2017-00137 Paper 33 at 3–5 (P.T.A.B. 
Nov. 3, 2017). 
29 Id. at 3 (emphasis in original). 
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But the patent owner countered that the hypothetical aspect 
of PTAB’s test should not be replaced by historical 
observation, as follows:  
 
The inquiry is not who Petitioner hired, what 
their credentials are, or what the searcher 
did or did not do for its search. Rather, the 
relevant inquiry, based on the legislative 
history, is whether a hypothetical ‘skilled 
searcher’ conducting a diligent search 
reasonably could have been expected to 
discover Wörn. […] Because Wörn is a U.S. 
patent, it is and has been readily accessible 
at the USPTO and online, and a skilled 
searcher conducting a diligent search 
reasonably could have been expected to 
discover it. 30 
Ultimately, in Valve, the patent owner’s understanding of the 
hypothetical aspect of the PTAB’s test was apparently 
adopted.31  
A. Which USPC classes and subclasses were 
searched by the examiner of the patent 
claims challenged in the IPR? 
 
The Board’s analysis in Valve focused on the USPC classes 
and subclasses that a skilled and reasonably diligent 
searcher would be expected to search in that case.32 The 
PTAB considered expert reports on that topic from both 
                                                          
30 See Patent Owner Reply in Support of Motion to Terminate, Valve 
Corp. v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd., Nos. IPR2017-00136 and IPR2017-
00137, Paper 34 at 1–2 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 6, 2018) (emphasis omitted). 
31 See Valve Corp. v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd., Nos. IPR2017-00136 and 
IPR2017-00137, Paper 43 at 4 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2018). 
32 Id. at 4–6. 
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litigants.33 Perhaps a less biased indication would be which 
USPC classes and subclasses had been searched by the 
examiner who, before the possibility of any bias from 
subsequent litigation events, examined and allowed the 
patent claims being challenged in the IPR proceedings. 
B. What were the USPC classes and subclasses 
of the prior art patent publications of record 
in the challenged patent? 
 
The prior patent publications identified by an examiner’s 
searches are generally made of record in the file history of 
the examined patent.34 Importantly, however, not all those 
prior patent publications of record necessarily pertain to the 
USPC classes and subclasses the examiner searched. Rather, 
the examiner may find additional prior art from citations 
that appear in a reference identified by a USPC class search, 
and such additional prior art may pertain to a different (and 
potentially unsearched) USPC class. 
The specifics of the USPC classes and subclasses that 
were argued in Valve are illustrative of the foregoing 
distinction between USPC classes searched, versus USPC 
classes represented in the list of prior art of record. The 
examiner of the patents challenged by the petitioner in Valve 
did not search USPC class/subclass 345/169 to which the 
Wörn reference pertains.35 However, the examiner found 
three other references in the USPC 345/169 subclass via a 
citation search on a pertinent reference that the examiner 
found by searching USPC class 463.36   
                                                          
33 Id. at 3–8. 
34 See MPEP § 1302.12 (9th ed. Rev. Jan. 2018). 
35 Petitioner Opposition to the Motion to Terminate, Valve Corp. v. 
Ironburg Inventions Ltd., Nos. IPR2017-00136 and IPR2017-00137, 
Paper 33 at 6–7 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 3, 2018). 
36 Id. 
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The petitioner argued that estoppel should not extend 
to the Wörn reference because patentability searches 
conducted by the examiner were undisputedly performed by 
a skilled searcher, and in a reasonably diligent manner, and 
yet did not search USPC 345/169 or discover Wörn.37  
C. Should invalidity searches by litigants be 
expected to include more USPC classes and 
subclasses than did the patentability search 
by the examiner? 
 
The patent owner in Valve rationalized the examiner’s choice 
to not search USPC 345/169, by arguing that prior art 
searches expected of litigants who file IPR petitions (as 
“invalidity” searches) should have a broader scope than 
examiner searches (as “patentability” searches).38 However, 
the Board gave no indication that it had been persuaded by 
the patent owner’s distinction,39 perhaps because 
37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) requires the IPR petitioner to 
identify how each challenged claim is “unpatentable,” and 
37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) limits the applicable scope of prior 
art more narrowly than in district court litigation 
proceedings.40  
 
                                                          
37 Id. 
38 See Patent Owner Reply in Support of the Motion to Terminate, Valve 
Corp. v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd., Nos. IPR2017-00136 and IPR2017-
00137, Paper 34 at 5–6 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 6, 2018). 
39 See generally Valve Corp. v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd., Nos. IPR2017-
00136 and IPR2017-00137, Paper 43 (P.T.A.B. 2018) (not providing any 
indication in the opinion that the Board was persuaded by the patent 
owner’s distinction). 
40 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2), (b)(4) (2017). 
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D. Using hindsight to identify USPC classes and 
subclasses for search may be unpersuasive in 
two ways. 
 
The patent owner in Valve offered expert testimony that the 
Wörn reference could be found by a particular text searching 
string applied to USPC class/subclass 345/169.41 The 
petitioner countered that a skilled searcher conducting a 
diligent search would not search USPC class/subclass 
345/169 but by using hindsight as a guide (i.e. using pre-
existing knowledge of which prior art publication—in this 
case Wörn—should be discovered), and that such a hindsight 
guided search methodology should be considered 
unpersuasive by the Board.42   
Specifically, the petitioner argued that the patent 
owner’s expert “surgically and dramatically reduced the 
impractically large number of patent references that would 
otherwise require manual review, by applying a narrowly-
tailored and seemingly contrived ‘example’ search string to a 
single USPC subclass 345/169 – a subclass that was not even 
searched by the examiner.”43 Ultimately, however, the Board 
in Valve was not persuaded by the petitioner’s hindsight 
argument.44 
                                                          
41 See Patent Owner Motion to Terminate, Valve Corp. v. Ironburg 
Inventions Ltd., Nos. IPR2017-00136 and IPR2017-00137, Paper 26 at 6 
(P.T.A.B. Oct. 13, 2017). 
42  Petitioner Opposition to the Motion to Terminate, Valve Corp. v. 
Ironburg Inventions Ltd., No. IPR2017-00137, Paper 33 at 3 (P.T.A.B. 
Nov. 3, 2017) (citing Johns Manville Corp. v. Knauf Insulation, Inc., No. 
IPR2016-00130, Paper 35 at 15 (P.T.A.B. May 8, 2017)).  
43 Id. at 11–12. 
44 See generally Valve Corp. v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd., No. IPR2017-
00137, Paper 43 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2018) (remaining silent on the 
petitioner’s hindsight argument)). 
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IV. HOW MUCH IS PRACTICAL?: HUMAN SEARCHES OF 
THE DRAWINGS OF PATENT PUBLICATIONS IN A 
USPC CLASS, VERSUS COMPUTER-AIDED TEXT 
SEARCHING. 
Reviewing drawings is often a practical concern when 
searching patent databases, especially in the mechanical arts 
where important features are often shown in the drawings 
but not well described using words in the text. For example, 
in Valve, the petitioner argued that the relevance of the Wörn 
reference to the claims challenged in the IPR could only be 
practically recognized by human inspection of Wörn’s 
drawings, as follows: 
 
The key distinguishing feature of the ’525 
and ’770 patents—the relative length of a 
back control compared with a housing 
dimension—is shown only in the drawings of 
Wörn, and not mentioned anywhere in its 
searchable text. Hence only a human 
searcher’s manual review of the drawings of 
every prior art reference in a chosen 
population, one reference at a time, could 
possibly recognize Wörn’s pertinence to the 
’525 and ’770 patents. 45  
The patent owner in Valve responded by arguing that the 
drawings of 700 patent publications could be reviewed by a 
single searcher in less than two days.46   
However, often human searchers would have to review 
the drawings of an impractically large number of patent 
                                                          
45 Petitioner Opposition to the Motion to Terminate, Valve Corp. v. 
Ironburg Inventions Ltd., No. IPR2017-00137, Paper 33 at 7 (P.T.A.B. 
Nov. 3, 2017) (emphasis in original).  
46 Patent Owner Reply in Support of Motion to Terminate, Valve Corp. v. 
Ironburg Inventions Ltd., Nos. IPR2017-00137 and IPR2017-00137, 
Paper 34 at 6 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 6, 2017). 
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publications in order to identify and recognize the 
significance of a particular patent publication.47 For example, 
in Valve, the petitioner argued that without first filtering 
using keyword searches that could miss relevant drawings, 
or choosing a particular USPC subclass based on hindsight, 
the drawings of many thousands of patents would need to be 
reviewed by human searchers to identify and recognize the 
significance of the Wörn reference.48 As context, the 
petitioner pointed out that the searches conducted by the 
examiner for the patent challenged in the Valve case 
encompassed USPC classes that included more than 100,000 
patent publications.49 
Ultimately, despite the petitioner’s allegations of 
reliance on hindsight,50 the PTAB was persuaded by the 
patent owner in Valve that a particular key word search 
(performed afterwards by the patent owner’s declarant) could 
have reduced the size of the group of patent publications for 
drawings review to only 49 patent publications.51 Although 
this avoids rather than addresses the practical problem of 
drawings review versus text searching, it suggests a 
litigation strategy for patent owners and leaves the door open 
for contrary proof for future petitioners. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The PTAB has recently interpreted the scope of IPR estoppel 
to include all previously-unraised prior patent publications 
in a broadly inclusive group of USPC classes and subclasses.  
                                                          
47 Petitioner Opposition to the Motion to Terminate, Valve Corp., No. 
IPR2017-00137, Paper 33 at 7-8 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 3, 2017).  
48 Id. at 8–11. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 11–12. 
51 Valve Corp. v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd., Nos. IPR2017-00137 and 
IPR2017-00137, Paper 43 at 7–8 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2018). 
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Hence, infringement defendants who want to include or 
maintain an IPR proceeding among other challenges to 
validity should ensure that their pre-filing prior art search 
includes the USPC class and subclass of the asserted patent, 
the USPC classes and subclasses searched by the examiner 
of the asserted patent, and the USPC classes and subclasses 
of all prior art references of record in the asserted patent. 
On the other hand, patent owners facing serial 
challenges to validity should aggressively allege estoppel to 
cover all previously-unraised patent publications in the 
foregoing USPC classes and subclasses. Patent owners 
should also consider concocting and offering as evidence an 
example text search string that captures the patent 
publication(s) that petitioner relies upon for a later validity 
challenge, within a small subset of patent publications. 
Based on the recent PTAB precedent described herein, it is 
primarily important that the patent owner’s example search 
string identify a small subset of patent publications—small 
enough that their drawings may be practically reviewable—
even if the required search string becomes so specific that it 
provokes protests of improper hindsight.  
